Convocada por diferentes estudiosos de los Padres de la Iglesia y del cristianismo antiguo en Latinoamérica, a saber, los profesores Ana Cristina Villa Betancourt, Andrés Mauricio Quevedo Rodríguez y Estiven Valencia Marín, de Colombia; Alejandro Nicola y Francisco Basttita-Harriet, de Argentina; Bruno Gripp, de Brasil; Pamela Chávez Aguilar, de Chile; y Jesús Ma. Aguiñaga Fernández, de México.

Recently, there have been calls to develop a more contextual approach to phenomenological psychopathology—an approach that attends to the socio-cultural as well as personal and biographical factors that shape experiences of mental illness. In this Perspective article, we argue that to develop this contextual approach, phenomenological psychopathology should adopt a new paradigm case. For decades, schizophrenia has served as the paradigmatic example of a condition that can be better understood through phenomenological investigation. And recent calls for a contextual approach continue (...) to use schizophrenia as their primary example. We argue, in contrast, that substance misuse provides a better paradigm case around which to develop a contextually sensitive phenomenological psychopathology. After providing a brief vignette and analysis of a case of substance misuse, we explain why this kind of condition requires considerable sensitivity and attention to context, better motivating the incorporation and development of new contextually sensitive approaches. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explain how Karl Jaspers’ concept of empathy can be expanded by drawing upon the tradition of philosophical phenomenology. In the first section, we offer an account of Jaspers' concepts of empathy and incomprehensibility as he develops them in General Psychopathology and “The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology.” In the second section, we survey the recent literature on overcoming Jaspers' notion of incomprehensibility and expanding his concept of empathy. In the third section, we outline the levels of investigation (...) at which phenomenological inquiries into psychopathology may proceed. These levels of human existence are, in descending order of depth, (1) phenomenal experiences, (2) interpretive frameworks, (3) modes of existence, and (4) existentials. In the fourth and final section, we argue that to fully empathically comprehend patients with schizophrenia and other mental disorders, the possibility of alterations at all four levels of existence must be acknowledged. (shrink)

Empathy is a topic of continuous debate in the nursing literature. Many argue that empathy is indispensable to effective nursing practice. Yet others argue that nurses should rather rely on sympathy, compassion, or consolation. However, a more troubling disagreement underlies these debates: There’s no consensus on how to define empathy. This lack of consensus is the primary obstacle to a constructive debate over the role and import of empathy in nursing practice. The solution to this problem seems obvious: Nurses need (...) to reach a consensus on the meaning and definition of empathy. But this is easier said than done. Concept analyses, for instance, reveal a profound ambiguity and heterogeneity of the concept of empathy across the nursing literature. Since the term “empathy” is used to refer to a range of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena, the presence of a conceptual ambiguity and heterogeneity is hardly surprising. Our proposal is simple. To move forward, we need to return to the basics. We should develop the concept from the ground up. That is, we should begin by identifying and describing the most fundamental form of empathic experience. Once we identify the most fundamental form of empathy, we will be able to distinguish among the more derivative experiences and behaviors that are addressed by the same name and, ideally, determine the place of these phenomena in the field of nursing. The aim of this article is, consequently, to lay the groundwork for a more coherent concept of empathy and thereby for a more fruitful debate over the role of empathy in nursing. In Part 1, we outline the history of the concept of empathy within nursing, explain why nurses are sometimes warry of adapting concepts from other disciplines, and argue that nurses should distinguish between adapting concepts from applied disciplines and from more theoretical disciplines. In Part 2, we show that the distinction between emotional and cognitive empathy—borrowed from theoretical psychology—has been a major factor in nurses’ negative attitudes toward emotional empathy. We argue, however, that both concepts fail to capture the most fundamental form of empathy. In Part 3, we draw on and present some of the seminal studies of empathy that can be found in the work of phenomenological philosophers including Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein. In Part 4, we outline how their understanding of empathy may facilitate current debates about empathy’s role in nursing. (shrink)

In this chapter, I introduce phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology by clarifying the kind of implicit experiences that phenomenologists are concerned with. In section one, I introduce the phenomenological concept of pre-reflective experience, focusing especially on its relation to the concept of implicit experience. In section two, I introduce the structure of pre-reflective self-consciousness, which has been studied extensively by both classical phenomenologists and contemporary phenomenological psychopathologists. In section three, I show how phenomenological psychopathologists rely on an account of pre-reflective self-consciousness (...) to better understand the experience of schizophrenia and I outline some of the methodological challenges that arise in this field of research. This introduction should facilitate critical engagement and collaboration between phenomenologists and researchers working across a variety of disciplines, including psychology, psychiatry, the cognitive sciences, and analytic philosophy of mind. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata la presentación que Henry Corbin hace del sufismo de Ibn ' Arabī. Pretende mostrar cómo el proyecto filosófico del pensador francés (atravesado de protestantismo, heideggerianismo y fenomenología) produce una obturación de la doctrina akbarí, que denota cierta falta de amor o desinterésen la alteridad en tanto alteridad. El itinerario constará de cinco pasos. Primero, nos acercaremos a los años de formación de Corbin. Segundo, presentaremo salgunos puntos esenciales de su obra más célebre, La imaginación creadora en (...) el sufismo de Ibn ‘Arabî. Tercero, se mostrarán aquellos aspectos de la doctrinade Ibn ' Arabī allí obturados. Cuarto, expondremos algunas conclusiones a partir de estas ausencias. Quinto, a modo de epílogo, y ya en el ámbito de la filosofía latinoamericana, ofreceremos una mirada al proyecto de la transmodernidad de Enrique Dussel, desde el paradigma del amor akbarí. (shrink)

Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, many of these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those who may benefit the most from them. In this article, we discuss our own experience of engaging with nursing researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of philosophical phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the meaning of “empathy” in nursing, which has important implications for (...) nursing research, training, and practice. However, our intention is not only to introduce and discuss this philosophical intervention. Rather, we present this intervention as a model for how philosophers might successfully engage with the field of nursing, and perhaps with other fields as well, with the aim of effecting positive change in research or practice. The article proceeds in five parts. First, we introduce the problem of conceptual clarity in nursing and explain why many nursing concepts are still in need of refinement. Second, we discuss the origins of the concept of empathy in nursing and outline the challenges associated with borrowing theory from other fields. Third, we explain how nurses tend to conceptualize empathy today, drawing upon the psychological distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Fourth, we discuss our intervention in this debate and explain how we attempt to resolve existing conceptual confusions by developing the concept of empathy from the ground up. Fifth, we conclude by briefly reflecting upon some of the challenges of interdisciplinary engagement and providing some recommendations based upon our own experience. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

Inspired by the work of Sellars, Cumpa (2014, 2018) and Buonomo (2021) have argued that we can evaluate our metaphysical proposals on fundamental categories in terms of their capacity for reconciling the scientific and the manifest image of the world. This criterion of fundamentality would allow us to settle the question of which categories among those proposed in the debate—e.g., substance, structure or facts—have a better explanatory value. The aim of this essay is to argue against a central assumption of (...) the criterion: semantic descriptivism. Specifically, I aim at showing that the criterion rests on the idea that the manifest picture is mostly a description of the world, and thus, it commits us with certain realism. Instead, I argue that at least some of the vocabulary we use to construct our manifest picture of the world, mental vocabulary, is evaluative rather than descriptive and thus creates problems in reconcile the manifest picture with scientific psychology and neurosciences. I conclude with some remarks on alternatives that could provide a way out of the fundamentality criterion. (shrink)

Are philosophy and literature allies or enemies in Jorge Luis Borges's fictions? In this paper, I argue that Borges can satisfy membership in the allies camp because his fictions provide the imaginative scenarios the allies believe are so necessary to this coalition; however, because his stories question philosophy's hold on reality, they can also seem to fall into the enemies camp by countervailing any claim philosophy has on reality and truth; although, ultimately, the manner in which Borges forges an alliance (...) between philosophy and literature will be for reasons not traditionally accepted by those in either the allies or enemies camps. (shrink)

Gianni Vattimo's Non-religious Christianity. Weakening of being, secularization and divine kenosis.

Aims and Objectives. This article uses the concept of embodiment to demonstrate a conceptual approach to applied phenomenology. -/- Background. Traditionally, qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals have been taught phenomenological methods, such as the epoché, reduction, or bracketing. These methods are typically construed as a way of avoiding biases so that one may attend to the phenomena in an open and unprejudiced way. However, it has also been argued that qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals can benefit from phenomenology’s well-articulated theoretical (...) framework, which consists of core concepts, such as selfhood, empathy, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment. -/- Design. This is a discursive article that demonstrates a conceptual approach to applied phenomenology. -/- Method. To outline and explain this approach to applied phenomenology, the Discussion section walks the reader through four stages of phenomenology, which progress incrementally from the most theoretical to the most practical. -/- Discussion. Part one introduces the philosophical concept of embodiment, which can be applied broadly to any human subject. Part two shows how philosophically trained phenomenologists use the concept of embodiment to describe general features of illness and disability. Part three illustrates how the phenomenological concept of embodiment can inform empirical qualitative studies and reflects on the challenges of integrating philosophy and qualitative research. Part four turns to phenomenology’s application in clinical practice and outlines a workshop model that guides clinicians through the process of using phenomenological concepts to better understand patient experience. -/- Conclusion and Relevance to Clinical Practice. A conceptual approach to applied phenomenology provides a valuable alternative to traditional methodological approaches. Phenomenological concepts provide a foundation for better understanding patient experience in both qualitative health research and clinical practice, and therefore provide resources for enhancing patient care. (shrink)

El autor del artículo edita y estudia una inscripción funeraria inédita de época helenística encontrada en Aptera (Creta) por la arqueóloga griega V. Ninioú-Kindelí. El texto de la inscripción dice así: A) Σώσανδρος | Βίτωνος. B) Ἀμφιμήδης | Σωσάνδρω.

The aim of this paper is to offer a version of the so-called conversational hypothesis of the ontogenetic connection between language and mindreading (Harris 1996, 2005; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010; Hughes et al. 2006). After arguing against a particular way of understanding the hypothesis (the communicative view), I will start from the justificatory view in philosophy of social cognition (Andrews 2012; Hutto 2004; Zawidzki 2013) to make the case for the idea that the primary function of belief and desire (...) attributions is to justify and normalize deviant patterns of behaviour. Following this framework, I elaborate upon the idea that development of folk psychological skills requires the subjects to engage in conversationally mediated joint and cooperative activities in order to acquire the conceptual capacity of ascribing propositional attitudes. After presenting the general version of the hypothesis, I present several testable sub-hypotheses and some psychological studies that give empirical plausibility to the hypothesis. (shrink)

The Blumenberg-Löwith 'debate' over the 'secularization hypothesis' is an evocative clash that has remained a matter of discussion both inside and outside of the mid-twentieth century German tradition, which has yet to register fully the implications of Blumenberg’s work on the topic of modernity. On one side is Hans Blumenberg, who perceives modernity as justified on its own terms. On the other side is Karl Löwith, who does not recognize a substantive break between modernity and its epochal genetic precursors. My (...) reading recognizes the heart of this debate to be over an impulse either to espouse or oppose the sovereignty of philosophical modernity in its relation to worldmaking. In this paper, I argue that Blumenberg’s thesis of 'self-assertion' describes a re-establishing of the project of worldmaking in a sophisticated and nuanced language that is missed by Löwith’s diagnosis of modern philosophy of history. (shrink)

“On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology” provides a framework for the phenomenological study of mental disorders. The framework relies on a distinction between (ontological) existentials and (ontic) modes. Existentials are the categorial structures of human existence, such as intentionality, temporality, selfhood, and affective situatedness. Modes are the particular, concrete phenomena that belong to these categorial structures, with each existential having its own set of modes. In the first section, we articulate this distinction by drawing primarily on the work of (...) Martin Heidegger—especially his study of the ontological structure of affective situatedness (Befindlichkeit) and its particular, ontic modes, which he calls moods (Stimmungen). In the second section, we draw on a study of grief to demonstrate how this framework can be used when conducting phenomenological interviews and analyses. In the concluding section, we explain how this framework can be guide phenomenological studies across a broad range of existential structures. (shrink)

Este artículo explora la relación entre la filosofía del límite de Eugenio Trías y el sufismo de Ibn ʿArabī. En primer lugar, pretende explicar la función de la filosofía de la religión en el sistema triasiano y por qué el maestro andalusí ocupa un lugar privilegiado en ella. Segundo, se ocupa de algunos aspectos esenciales de la doctrina akbarí que la filosofía del límite obtura, como la declaración de la unidad del Ser (tawḥīd), la conjugación de lo exotérico y lo (...) esotérico, la superación de la propia creencia, el camino de la servidumbre (ʿubūdiyya), el tránsito de la pasión súbita de amor (hawā) al amor espiritual (ḥubb), la caballería espiritual (futuwwa) y la morada de la no-morada (maqām lā maqām), los cuales comparten un nexo común: el trascendimiento de lo egoico y el interés en el otro en tanto otro. Finalmente, se defenderá que la obturación triasiana se debe tanto al influjo de Henry Corbin, como sobre todo, a las propias limitaciones de su proyecto filosófico, para el que el Ibn ʿArabī ausente constituye una suerte de sombra. (shrink)

Psychedelic-Assisted Psychotherapy is being investigated as a treatment for a range of psychiatric illnesses. Current research suggests that the kinds of subjective experiences induced by psychedelic compounds play key roles in producing therapeutic outcomes. To date, most knowledge of therapeutic psychedelic experiences are derived from psychometric assessments with scales such as the Mystical Experience Questionnaire. While these approaches are insightful, more nuanced and detailed descriptions of psychedelic-induced changes to subjective experience are required. Drawing on recent advancements in qualitative methods arising (...) from the interdisciplinary field of phenomenological psychopathology, we propose a systematic and comprehensive investigation into how Psychedelic-Assisted Psychotherapy alters subjective experience. This research program aims to characterise the nature of therapeutic psychedelic experiences by drawing on concepts from philosophical phenomenology. Such characterisations should, moreover, contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms of psychedelic therapy, the role of integration therapy, and related philosophical debates. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of how existential phenomenology has influenced qualitative research methods across a range of disciplines across the social, health, educational, and psychological sciences. It focuses specifically on how the concepts of “existential structures,” or “existentials”—such as selfhood, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment—have been used in qualitative research. After providing a brief introduction to what qualitative research is and why philosophers should be interested in it, the chapter provides clear, straightforward examples of how qualitative researchers have used (...) existentials to analyze qualitative data and design qualitative studies. The chapter is intended to introduce philosophers to existential approaches to phenomenological qualitative research, with the aim of facilitating interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine recent phenomenological research on both depressive and manic episodes, with the intention of showing how phenomenologically oriented studies can help us overcome the apparently paradoxical nature of mixed states. First, I argue that some of the symptoms included in the diagnostic criteria for depressive and manic episodes in the DSM-5 are not actually essential features of these episodes. Second, I reconsider the category of major depressive disorder (MDD) from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, arguing that (...) severe depressive episodes should not be characterized by any particular moods (such as sadness, hopelessness, or guilt), and should instead be characterized by a diminished capacity for finding ourselves situated in and attuned to the world at all. In other words, the affective dimension of depression should be characterized as a change in the way we have moods, not as a change from one kind of mood to another. Third, I turn to mania, arguing that manic episodes, taken as the opposite of depressive episodes, should be characterized not by any particular moods (such as euphoria, grandiosity, or even irritability), but should instead be characterized by an enhanced or heightened capacity for finding ourselves situated in and attuned to the world. In other words, the affective dimension of mania, like the affective dimension of depression, should be understood as a change in the way we have moods, not as a change from one kind of mood to another. Fourth, I return to the phenomenon of mixed states and argue that the affective dimension of depression and mania, when conceived along the phenomenological lines I set forth in the previous sections, dissolves the paradox of mixed states by showing that the essential characteristics of depression and mania cannot and do not coincide. Many cases of mixed states are diagnosed because moods that we take to be essential features of either depression or mania arise within the context of what is considered to be the opposite kind of episode (e.g. dysphoria, typically associated with depression, often arises in what is otherwise considered a manic state). However, if we conceive of the affective dimension of depression as a decrease in the degree to which one is situated in and attune to the world through moods, and the affective dimension of mania as an increase in the degree to which one is situated in and attuned to the world through moods, then the particular mood one finds oneself in is simply irrelevant to the diagnosis of either depression or mania. As a result, the manifestation of any particular moods in what otherwise seems to be a pure manic or depressive episode does not constitute a mixed state. (shrink)

La Hipótesis del Continuo (HC) es la suposición de que dado el primer transfinito, ℵ0 , el cardinal de los naturales; el siguiente cardinal, ℵ1 , es el cardinal de los números reales. La Hipótesis Generalizada del Continuo es que dado un transfinito ℵn , el siguiente transfinito es el conjunto potencia de dicho transfinito ℵn+1 = P(ℵn). Desde la teoría intuitiva de conjuntos cantoriana se ha tratado conocer si en dicha teoría se sigue HC. Sin embargo Cantor no pudo (...) probar HC. Tiempo después Gödel y Cohen probarán que HC es independiente a la teoría de conjuntos ZF ó ZFC, si se acepta eleccíon. Después del trabajo de Cohen, Gödel planteo un programa para extender, axiomáticamente, ZFC con el cual se pudiera conocer sí en ZFC HC se sigue, o se sigue ¬HC. Hoy en día aun se desconoce una extensíon HC ó ¬HC en ZFC. Gutiérrez plantea que de hecho posiblemente hoy en día no hay extensíon axiomática filosóficamente adecuada que pueda determinar si en ZFC se sigue HC ó ¬HC. Desde la perspectiva de Gutiérrez, dado que no existe una extensíon adecuada en ZFC para determinar HC, se puede decir que HC es absolutamente indecidible. Esta conferencia se tratará de entender los conceptos de absoluta indecidibilidad planteada por Gutiérrez, el porqué considera que sucede esto con respecto a HC en ZFC y algunas posibles soluciones que podrían explorarse. (shrink)

Se buscará mostrar que las críticas de Berkeley son pertinentes al mostrar que Newton utiliza una justificación que se bása en: 1) La experiecia sensible y 2)En una noción de Dios como poder activo. Con respecto a 1) si bien se puede justificar un método con la experiencia sensible, este no dejara este ámbito y no es posible pasar a las matemáticas con este metodo. Con respecto a 2) Dios es una fuente de justificación posbile para la época, sin embargo (...) en Newton se convierte en un poder activo que se contrapone a otras fomas de entender a Dios como garante de las leyes, más no como un poder que intervenga en el mundo. (shrink)

In this chapter, I provide an overview of phenomenological approaches to psychiatric classification. My aim is to encourage and facilitate philosophical debate over the best ways to classify psychiatric disorders. First, I articulate phenomenological critiques of the dominant approach to classification and diagnosis—i.e., the operational approach employed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). Second, I describe the type or typification approach to psychiatric classification, which I distinguish into three different (...) versions: ideal types, essential types, and prototypes. I argue that despite their occasional conflation in the contemporary literature, there are important distinctions among these approaches. Third, I outline a new phenomenological-dimensional approach. I show how this approach, which starts from basic dimensions of human existence, allows us to investigate the full range of psychopathological conditions without accepting the validity of current diagnostic categories. (shrink)

Phenomenology has been adapted for use in qualitative health research, where it’s often used as a method for conducting interviews and analyzing interview data. But how can phenomenologists study subjects who cannot accurately reflect upon or report their own experiences, for instance, because of a psychiatric or neurological disorder? For conditions like these, qualitative researchers may gain more insight by conducting observational studies in lieu of, or in conjunction with, interviews. In this article, we introduce a phenomenological approach to conducting (...) this kind of observational research. The approach relies on conceptual grounding to focus a study on specific aspects of the participants’ experiences. Moreover, the approach maintains the openness to novel discoveries that qualitative research requires while also providing a structured framework for data collection and analysis. To illustrate its practical application, we use examples of hemispatial neglect—a neurologic disorder in which patients characteristically lack awareness of their own illness and bodily capacities. However, the approach that we describe can be applied more broadly to the study of complex illness experiences and other experiential alterations. (shrink)

[español] En primer lugar, el texto ofrece un acercamiento al papel que amor y nostalgia cumplen en la poesía de Emilio Prados, así como a su íntimo nexo con la muerte como aniquilación mística. Como herramienta interpetativa, recurriré a la razón poética de María Zambrano, autora profundamente emparentada, vital y teóricamente, con la poesía pradiana. Este enfoque permitirá una visión de conjunto sobre la obra del poeta español y en segundo lugar, trazar una comparativa con el saudosismo de Teixeira de (...) Pascoaes. Así, indicaré las numerosas coincidencias que existen entre ambos y me detendré en la cuestión de la muerte mística, ámbito más problemático, donde sin embargo, puede apreciarse una comunión de espíritu entre el español y el portugués. ****************** [english] Firstly, the text offers an approach to the function of love and nostalgia in the poetry of Emilio Prados, as much as its intimate connection with death as mystical annihilation. As interpretive tool, I will use the poetic reason of María Zambrano, an author deeply linked, vital and theoretically, with pradian poetry. This focus will provide an overall view of Prado's work and the possibility of a comparison with Teixeira de Pascoaes's saudosism. Thus, I will point same coincidences between them and I will consider the question of mystical death. This sphere, although it is problematic, can show some kind of community of spirit between both. (shrink)

El autor del artículo edita y estudia tres inscripciones funerarias inéditas de época helenística encontradas en la necrópolis occidental de Aptera (Creta) por la arqueóloga griega V. Ninioú-Kindelí. El texto de las inscripciones dice así: Inscr. 1, A) Ἰ̣ κ̣ ̣αρ̣[- -] | Κοσίλ[λω], in L. 1 quizás Ι̣κ̣α̣ρ̣[ος]. B) Νέων | Κοσίλ[λω]; Inscr. 2, Νικ̣α[- - -] | Διογ[νήτω ?]; Inscr. 3, [- - -] | [- - -]δα. La primera inscripción presenta los nombres de dos difuntos, dos hermanos (...) hijos de Cosilo. El nombre Κόσιλλος aparece en Creta, aparte de esta inscripción, en Eliro en Creta Occidental en el s. II a.C. Fuera de Creta este nombre no ha sido atestiguado en ninguna otra parte. En la tercera inscripción se han conservado las dos letras finales del nombre del padre en la segunda línea. Se trata probablemente de un antropónimo con un sufijo en -δας, cuyo empleo es usual en cretense. (shrink)

Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology.

Immanuel Kant’s work on the sublimity of aesthetic experience lends itself to puzzlement, if not misclassification. Complicating matters, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of sublimity: respectively, the “mathematical” and “dynamical” sublime. More mystifying is that the sublime is ineffable, beyond the ken of human comprehension. These perplexities notwithstanding, Kant argues that sublime sentiment produces a feeling of supersensible comfort. Commentators identify this comfort emanating most strongly from the dynamical sublime. However, in this paper I draw from the unity of reason (...) thesis to offer a plausible account of how the mathematical sublime is equally capable of providing the same feeling of supersensible comfort. (shrink)

Este capítulo examina una posible preocupación filosófica especializada por la técnica en la práctica filosófica colombiana. Se argumenta, según las fuentes consultadas: una génesis, un desarrollo; con unas rupturas, continuidades y una consolidación reciente de una comunidad académica en el asunto. Este hecho cultural se registra en un corpus documental compuesto por artículos de revistas especializadas de filosofía, obras de filósofos colombianos, memorias de congresos nacionales de filosofía en los que registran coloquios y ponencias en esta materia, en los currículos (...) de los programas de filosofía, tanto en pregrado como posgrado, en los que aparecen cátedras en filosofía de la técnica o tecnologías, y proyectos de investigación con tesis en esta especialidad. Estas y otras prácticas académicas permiten concluir de la existencia de una discusión filosófica de la técnica; similar a lo que sucede en otros países de Iberoamérica y a nivel mundial. Para desglosar tal conjetura en este apartado se precisa cómo surge la deliberación de la técnica en la tradición filosófica. Luego, se examina cómo emerge el tema en el contexto filosófico colombiano, y puntualiza la obra de Danilo Cruz Vélez en torno a una filosofía de la técnica. Finalmente, se llegará a unas conclusiones parciales que demuestren los aportes de la comunidad filosófica colombiana en dicha temática. La demostración de la hipótesis se sustenta teórica y metodológicamente con dos criterios: uno hermenéutico, con técnicas de interpretación filológica, histórica, filosófica y otro bibliométrico, los cuales permiten una reconstrucción, síntesis, análisis e interpretación de las deliberaciones del tema, desde 1964 al 2018. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...) sections 2 and 3, I will discuss the two main existing conceptions of the conditions that a mental state must satisfy to count as an episode of remembering. The first of these approaches is backward-looking. It puts forward conditions that strictly concern the aetiology of the mental state. I will argue that the conditions offered by the backward-looking approach are both too strong and too weak: They rule out mental states which, intuitively, count as memories while including mental states which, intuitively, do not qualify as memories. The second approach is forward-looking. It puts forward conditions that only concern the use that the subject makes of the mental state while forming beliefs about their own life. I will argue that the conditions proposed by the forward-looking approach are both too weak and too strong as well. However, the discussion of the two approaches will allow us to extract some helpful lessons on the constraints that any proposal about the nature of remembering should respect. An alternative approach aimed at incorporating those lessons will be offered in section 4 by drawing on the literature on functionalism. In section 5, I will argue that this approach can, on the one hand, accommodate as memories those mental states which indicate that the backward-looking approach and the forward-looking approach are too strict while, on the other hand, excluding those mental states which suggest that the two alternative approaches are too permissive. Accordingly, I will conclude that construing memory along functionalist lines is a satisfactory approach to the nature of remembering. (shrink)

Necessity can be ascribed not only to propositions, but also to feelings. In the Critique of Judgment (KdU), Immanuel Kant argues that a feeling of beauty is the necessary satisfaction instantiated by the ‘free play’ of the cognitive faculties, which provides the grounds for a judgment of taste (KdU 5:196, 217-19). In contradistinction to the theoretical necessity of the Critique of Pure Reason and the moral necessity of the Critique of Practical Reason, the necessity assigned to a judgment of taste (...) is exemplary necessity (KdU 5:237). Necessity can also be assigned by employing the de re/de dicto distinction, namely, by ascribing entailments of what must necessarily hold to either a thing (de re) or to a proposition (de dicto). Although Kant does not use the distinction in any of the three Critiques, this omission has not prevented Kant scholars from applying the distinction in their analyses of the first two Critiques. In this paper, I examine the role that modality plays in Kant’s third Critique and I attempt to bring the de re/de dicto distinction to bear on Kant’s famous aesthetic theory. Ultimately, I perform a retrospective classification of the modality of taste by arguing that because a judgment of taste is not a statement about an objective fact, a judgment of ‘x is beautiful’ can only be read as de dicto necessary. (shrink)

The authors explore the works of a group of Colombian artists of the twentieth century who resort to the references of the Latin American pre-Hispanic world as a plastic strategy of a modern art with strong roots in their own culture. Thus, the Bachué group and the cases of Pedro Nel Gómez and Rómulo Rozo are analyzed as alternatives to the official and prevailing art, with an avant-garde tendency, from a nationalist and indigenist point of view.

In this article, we develop a new approach to integrating philosophical phenomenology with qualitative research. The approach uses phenomenology’s concepts, namely existentials, rather than methods such as the epoché or reductions. We here introduce the approach to both philosophers and qualitative researchers, as we believe that these studies are best conducted through interdisciplinary collaboration. In section 1, we review the debate over phenomenology’s role in qualitative research and argue that qualitative theorists have not taken full advantage of what philosophical phenomenology (...) has to offer, thus motivating the need for new approaches. In section 2, we introduce our alternative approach, which we call Phenomenologically Grounded Qualitative Research (PGQR). Drawing parallels with phenomenology’s applications in the cognitive sciences, we explain how phenomenological grounding can be used to conceptually front-load a qualitative study, establishing an explicit focus on one or more structures of human existence, or of our being in the world. In section 3, we illustrate this approach with an example of a qualitative study carried out by one of the authors: a study of the existential impact of early parental bereavement. In section 4, we clarify the kind of knowledge that phenomenologically grounded studies generate and how it may be integrated with existing approaches. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre’s work in ethics follows in the footsteps of twentieth century efforts to put the ideals of Enlightenment and modernity on trial, and his book After Virtue diagnoses a wide-spread malaise in contemporary moral discourse. As a corrective to this condition, MacIntyre offers a remedy along Aristotelian-Thomistic lines. He specifically conceives of a recovery of these lines that would allow for a common ground in moral debates which would reveal the normative and teleological character of the human good. However, (...) within these pages, I argue that MacIntyre underestimates how his moral corrective is actually a re-inscription of the Enlightenment project, and thus equally doomed to failure. I do this by sketching out three different lines. First, I present MacIntyre’s appraisal of modern moral discourse, which has long since abandoned a reliance on Aristotelian principles of ethics. Second, I outline an informative disjunction MacIntyre sets up between having to choose between a Nietzschean or an Aristotelian model of ethical action. Last, I argue that MacIntyre’s own choice, simultaneously based on, but also diverging from, Aristotle fails because his revamped account of the virtue formation so necessary for modern human flourishing leaves open a space for its development according to contingent histories and traditions, which implies an attenuated account of the virtue ethics he seeks to recover, and vindicates, rather than condemns, the Enlightenment’s attempt to liberate moral theories from its strict teleological forbears. (shrink)

Resumen: El texto pretende un acercamiento al carácter amoroso de la escritura de Maria Gabriela Llansol. Explica cómo ésta, igual que la de María Zambrano, lleva la defensa amorosa del devenir de Nietzsche un paso más allá, en tanto nace de un interés por la otredad en sí misma y no de una voluntad de autoafirmación. La ruptura de las nociones convencionales de tiempo, espacio e identidad será una de las vías que utiliza. En ello puede apreciarse cierta similitud con (...) Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, de quien aprendió la necesidad de buscar un tiempo propio para el alma, diferente del cuantitativo y cuya doctrina del amor y de la santidad exige un genuino interés en la otredad en tanto otredad. -/- Abstract: The text is an attempt to approach the loving character of the writing of Maria Gabriela Llansol. It explains how her works, similarly to those of María Zambrano, go further than Nietzsche in the affirmation of the becoming: as long as there is not will of self-affirmation, but an authentic interest in alterity. One of the paths she explores is to break the conventional notions of time, space and identity. It is possible to appreciate two coincidences with Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī. First, Llansol learned from him the need of an own time for the soul, different from quantitative time. Second, Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of love and sainthood also implies a genuine interest in otherness as otherness. (shrink)

John Searle’s theory of social ontology posits that there are indispensable normative components in the linguistic apparatuses termed status functions, collective intentionality, and collective recognition, all of which, he argues, make the social world. In this paper, I argue that these building blocks of Searle’s theory are caught in a petitio of constitutive circularity. Moreover, I note how Searle fails to observe language in reciprocal relation to the institutions which not only are shaped by it but also shape language’s practical (...) applications. According to Searle, social theorists that tried to show a connection between society, culture, and language all failed to see the constitutive role of language in the making of social reality. Consequently, I believe that Searle is himself guilty of a certain kind of blind presumption, and argue that Hegel’s philosophy of culture, which Searle dismisses as implausible, offers a more cohesive account of the normative transactions between human beings and their social world. (shrink)

The application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in healthcare and epidemiology undoubtedly has many benefits for the population. However, due to its environmental impact, the use of AI can produce social inequalities and long-term environmental damages that may not be thoroughly contemplated. In this paper, we propose to consider the impacts of AI applications in medical care from the One Health paradigm and long-term global health. From health and environmental justice, rather than settling for a short and fleeting green honeymoon between (...) health and sustainability caused by AI, it should aim for a lasting marriage. To this end, we conclude by proposing that, in the upcoming years, it could be valuable and necessary to promote more interconnected health, call for environmental cost transparency, and increase green responsibility. (shrink)

Is it possible to train empathy? We suggest a new way, based on insights from phenomenology.

This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding (...) anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to introduce a new concept of “pain-related bodily doubt,” which complements current concepts currently in use, such as pain-related fear, pain catastrophizing, and pain self-efficacy. This new concept, adapted from recent philosophical work on illness experience, has the potential to positively contribute to pain research and clinical practice by providing a vocabulary for clinicians and patients to discuss implicit or tacit dimensions of pain-related experiences.

In this article, I argue that phenomenological psychopathologists, despite their critical attitude toward mainstream psychiatry, still hold problematic prejudices about the nature of psychiatric conditions as illness or disorder. I suggest that phenomenological psychopathologists turn to resources in the neurodiversity and mad pride movements to critically reflect upon these prejudices and appreciate the methodological problems that they pose.